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Résumé / Abstract
Nousmesurons le gain de productivité réalisé quand les travailleurs sont
payés à la pièce plutôt qu'à taux fixe; i.e., l'effet incitatif. Nos données proviennent
des archives d'une compagnie qui s'occupe de la plantation d'arbres en
Colombie-Britannique. Cette compagnie a payé ses travailleurs à la pièce et à taux
fixe. Nos données contiennent des informations sur la productivité et sur les salaires
quotidiens des travailleurs sur une période de presque six mois. De plus, nous
observons les mêmes travailleurs sous les deux systèmes de paye, ce qui nous
permet de contrôler les effets spécifiques aux individus dans les données. Nous
développons et estimons un modèle simple du genre principal agent pour analyser
le comportement des travailleurs sous les deux systèmes de paye. Le modèle
implique un choix optimal de la part de la firme du système de paye en fonction des
conditions de plantation. Nous utilisons le modèle pour déterminer les implications
statistiques de la mesure de l'effet incitatif. Nous montrons que bien que les
méthodes de régression simple ne sont pas capables d'identifier l'effet incitatif (à
cause de l'endogénéité du système de paye), elles peuvent être utilisées pour calculer
les bornes inférieures et supérieures de l'effet incitatif. Nous évaluons ces bornes à
5% et 32% de la productivité observée quand les travailleurs sont payés à la pièce.
De plus, nous montrons que le modèle peut être estimé de façon structurelle en
incluant directement dans l'estimation la décision optimale de la part de la firme au
niveau de son choix du système de paye. Nos résultats structurels suggèrent que
l'effet incitatif compte pour 9,1% de la productivité observée quand les travailleurs
sont payés à la pièce.
We estimate the gain in productivity that is realized by paying
workers piece rates rather than fixed wages; i.e., the incentive effect. Our data
come from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm that paid
its workers both piece rates and fixed wages. These data contain information on
the daily productivity of workers over a period of nearly six months.
Furthermore, we observe the same workers under both piece rates and fixed
wages, allowing us to control for individual-specific effects in the data.We
develop and estimate an agency model of worker behaviour under piece rates
and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice
of a compensation system as a function of planting conditions. We use the model
to derive statistical implications for the incentive effect. We demonstrate
that while simple regression methods cannot identify the incentive effect (due to
the endogeneity of the payment system), they can provide upper and lower
bounds to this effect. We estimate these bounds to be 5% and 32% of observed
productivity on piece rate contracts. We also demonstrate that the model can be
estimated structurally, wherein the firm's optimal choice of a compensation
system is built directly into the estimation procedure. Structural results suggest
that incentives accounted for 9.1% of observed productivity.
Mots Clés : Systèmes de compensation, effet incitatif, modèles principal-agent
Keywords : Compensation Systems, Incentive Effect, Principal-Agent Models
JEL : D2, J3, L2
1. Introduction
The role of compensation policy in inuencing worker performance
within the rm has been analysed extensively by economic theorists; see,
for example, the work of Grossman and Hart (1982), Hart and Holm-
strom (1985), and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Recently, economists
have begun to investigate the empirical implications of this research. Of
particular interest has been the eects that compensation policies have
on worker productivity, often called \incentive eects". Examples of this
research include Lazear (1996) as well as the papers in Blinder (1990)
and Ehrenberg (1990). One of the main obstacles to empirical work in
this area is that compensation schemes cannot, in general, be considered
exogenous. For example, Brown (1990) presents evidence that compensa-
tion policies are related to the observable characteristics of the rm. This
suggests that the eects of compensation on worker productivity must be
modelled simultaneously with the choice of a compensation system by the
rm. In this paper, we present a rst step toward this goal. We develop
a model of the rm's choice of a compensation system that takes account
of the worker's performance under the dierent options. We focus on
the choice between paying a xed-wage contract, under which a worker's
wage is independent of his output, and a piece-rate contract, under which
a worker's wage is an explicit function of his output. The model permits
us to decompose the dierence in observed productivity between piece-
rate and xed-wage contracts into an incentive eect (the dierence in
observed productivity due to changes in eort, holding conditions con-
stant) and a treatment eect (the dierence in observed productivity due
to changing conditions beyond the worker's control). We estimate the size
of the incentive eect using payroll data collected from a tree-planting rm
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located in the Province of British Columbia, Canada.
In many ways, the tree-planting industry is well-suited to measuring
incentive eects. Worker output is easily observable and compensation
systems vary across and (sometimes) within rms. We have collected
data from a rm which wishes to remain anonymous and which paid its
workers both xed wages and piece rates. Our data contain information
concerning the daily productivity and wages of tree planters, working
under both xed wages and piece rates, over a planting season in 1991,
nearly six months.
A number of practical reasons also exist for studying the tree-planting
industry in British Columbia. First, British Columbia produces around
twenty-ve percent of the softwood lumber in North America.
1
Any poli-
cies aecting timber supply within this province can have important im-
plications for North American lumber markets. Next, the scope of re-
forestation in British Columbia is huge. At its peak, between 1981 and
1985, almost 2 billion seedlings were planted, an average of 400 million
seedlings each year. While the pace of reforestation has slowed somewhat
since then, approximately 200 million seedlings are still planted each year
in British Columbia. Because the scope of planting is so large, small
improvements in personnel policy can result in large savings. For exam-
ple, an average tree costs about $0.50 to plant, so a ten percent saving
can yield about $10 million per year. Third, conservationalists and envi-
ronmentalists have actively supported improved methods of reforestation,
but devising such methods requires information concerning how successful
past and current methods have been as well as information concerning why
1
For example, when statistics are reported for Canada, they are reported as \East
of the Rockies" and British Columbia. Moreover, British Columbia is broken up into
three regions { the coast, the southern interior, and the northern interior { each of
which produces more timber than any province of Canada or state of the Union.
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these eorts have or have not been successful. Finally, there has been a
recent movement a foot to legislate that all workers be paid a xed wage
in the tree-planting industry. Firms in the industry have resisted this
sort of change; we provide the rst detailed evidence concerning why this
change could make reforestation in British Columbia disasterously more
expensive.
Controlling for treatment eects requires modelling the rm's deci-
sion to pay xed wages or piece rates. Our model of contractual choice is
based on interviews conducted with the managers of the rm which pro-
vided our data. In this manner, the paper resembles a case study. Yet,
to the extent that workers are representative, our estimates on the size
of the incentive eect have general applicability. Researchers working on
models of contractual choice have developed a number of possible explana-
tions for choosing one contract over another. These include risk aversion
and transaction costs associated with determining the contract [Cheung
(1969) and Ferrall and Shearer (1994)], quality-versus-quantity considera-
tions [Stiglitz (1975) and Lazear (1986)], and nancial constraints [Laont
and Matoussi (1995)]. We focus on the quantity-quality trade-o. Piece
rates have the advantage of providing incentives for workers to work hard
and consequently to plant a lot of trees. Yet, piece rates also reduce the
incentive to the worker of producing quality output.
Workers are hired into the tree-planting industry to plant trees on
land that has recently been logged. The planting process is well-suited
for piece-rate pay since output is easily observable. In the extreme, one
merely has to subtract the number of trees that the worker brings back
at the end of the day from the number he was issued. Yet, planting
conditions can vary a great deal from site to site, and these conditions
determine the level of diculty of planting trees. If conditions are very
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dicult, then workers may spend less time and eort ensuring that the
trees are planted properly. Poorly planted trees will not survive, and this
exposes the rm to possible nes by the government and the loss of future
contracts. Thus, the quality of planting is a major concern of rms as
well.
In our model, we incorporate asymmetric information between work-
ers and the rm over planting conditions. The productivity of a worker
is a function of his eort level and a random productivity shock. The
productivity shock captures the planting conditions that are beyond the
worker's control. Workers are assumed to observe the value of the pro-
ductivity shock before they choose their eort level. These conditions,
along with the method of pay, determine the number of trees the worker
plants and whether the trees are planted well. In general, the value to the
worker of planting trees well is more sensitive to conditions than is the
value of planting trees poorly. A well-planted tree must be placed prop-
erly in the ground and appropriately distanced from the trees around it.
If conditions are dicult, then planting properly will be very time con-
suming. For example, if the ground is very hard, then digging the holes to
plant the trees will take more time and eort than if the ground is loose.
Similarly, if the terrain is steep, then ensuring that trees are adequately
spaced will require more time and eort than if the terrain is at. This
reduces the relative value of planting trees well. Planting poorly depends
less on conditions since, in the limit, the worker can simply throw his
trees away.
The key to the model is the dierent incentives embodied in the two
payment schemes. Under xed wages, the worker will always provide the
minimum possible eort level. Since his pay is independent of his output,
no benet accrues to planting extra trees. Under piece rates, an incentive
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exists to plant extra trees. However, depending on planting conditions,
the worker may prefer to plant these trees well or poorly. The worker
cheats when conditions are poor because the eort cost associated with
planting well is prohibitively high.
The rm can only observe the parameters of the distribution of pro-
duction shocks (e.g., average conditions), and the total number of trees
planted. We solve the model for the rm's optimal choice of compensation
scheme as a function of these parameters. Evident from our discussions
with rm managers is that piece rates are set such that they are inversely
related to planting diculty. We specify conditions under which the equi-
librium piece rate will be negatively correlated with planting conditions
and derive the implications for the observed data. We demonstrate that
the rm is more likely to choose a xed-wage compensation system when
average planting conditions are poor. Under such conditions, paying the
worker piece rates implies a high probability that the worker will cheat.
We derive the empirical implications of the model at several levels.
First, we demonstrate that the dierence between observed productivity
under piece-rate contracts and xed-wage contracts will be larger than
the corresponding dierence in observed total real wages. This result de-
rives from the labour supply constraint of the worker; viz., despite low
productivity under xed-wage contracts, the worker must be paid enough
money to keep him at the rm. Second, we show that the incentive eect
is bounded from above by the observed dierence in average productiv-
ity between the two types of contracts and bounded from below by the
observed dierence in real wages. Finally, we show that the model can
be estimated structurally, permitting a more precise measurement of the
incentive eect. We use the model to put structure on data collected from
the payroll records of a tree-planting rm. We bound the incentive eect
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between 60 and 366 trees per day, or between 6% and 37% of observed
output on piece-rate contracts. Our results from structural estimation
suggest the incentive eect is equal to 88.53 trees per day, or 9.1% of
observed output on piece-rate contracts.
Our results are consistent with those reported elsewhere. For exam-
ple, Lazear (1996) attributes a 20% increase in individual worker produc-
tivity resulting from the introduction of a pay-for-performance system
in an auto-glass company. In his review of early case-study evidence,
Lawler (1971) reports that the introduction of individual incentive plans
increased worker productivity between 10 and 20%. Our structural results
lie at the lower end of this range suggesting the importance of control-
ling for endogeneity in the estimation of these models. Mitchell, Lewin
and Lawler (1990) estimate the productivity gain due to prot sharing
plans to be 8.4%. Jones and Kato (1995) estimate the productivity gain
resulting from employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) to be 4 to 5%.
The larger eects of individual incentive plans maybe due to an absence
of the free-riding problem that plagues group-incentive schemes such as
prot sharing and ESOPs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
briey the tree-planting industry in British Columbia. In section 3, we
develop a model of contractual choice. In section 4, the empirical impli-
cations of the model are derived, while in Section 5, we discuss the data,
and in section 6, we present the results. We conclude in section 7.
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2. Tree Planting in British Columbia
While timber is a renewable resource, active reforestation can in-
crease the speed at which forests regenerate and thus ensures a steady
supply of timber to the North-American market. Extensive reforestation
is undertaken by both the Ministry of Forests and the major timber-
harvesting rms who hold Tree Farm Licenses.
2
The mechanics of this reforestation are relatively straightforward.
Prior to the harvest of any tract of coniferous timber, random samples of
cones are taken from the trees of the tract, and seedlings are grown from
the seeds contained in these cones. This ensures that the seedlings to be
replanted are compatible with the local microclimates and soil as well as
representative of the historical species composition.
Tree planting is a simple, yet physically exhausting, task. It involves
digging a hole with a special shovel, placing a seedling in this hole, and
then covering its roots with soil, ensuring that the tree is upright and that
the roots are fully covered. The level of energy required to perform the
task depends on the terrain on which the planting is done. In general, the
terrain can vary a great deal from site to site. In some cases, after a tract
has been harvested, the land is prepared for planting by burning whatever
slash timber remains and by \screeng" the forest oor. Screeng involves
removing the natural build-up of organic matter on the forest oor so that
the soil is exposed. Screeng makes planting easier because seedlings must
2
In British Columbia, nearly 90 percent of all timber is on government-owned
(Crown) land. Basically, the Crown, through the Ministry of Forests, sells the right
to harvest the timber on this land in two dierent ways. The most common way is
through administratively set prices to thirty-four rms who hold Tree Farm Licenses.
These licenses have been negotiated over the last three-quarter century, and require
that the licensee adopt specic harvesting as well as reforestation plans. About 90
percent of all Crown timber is harvested by rms holding Tree Farm Licenses. The
second, and less common way, to sell timber is at public auction through the Small
Business Forest Enterprise Program. In this case, the Ministry of Forests assumes the
responsibility of reforestation.
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be planted directly in the soil. Sites that are relatively at or that have
been prepared are much easier to plant than sites that are very steep
or have not been prepared. The typical minimum density of seedlings
is about 1,800 stems per hectare, or an inter-tree spacing of about 2.4
meters, although this can vary substantially.
3
An average planter can
plant about 900 trees per day, about half a hectare. An average harvested
tract is around 250 hectares, so planting such a tract would take about
500 man days.
Typically, tree-planting rms are chosen to plant seedlings on har-
vested tracts through a process of competitive bidding. Depending on
the land tenure arrangement, either a timber-harvesting rm or the Min-
istry of Forests will call for sealed-bid tenders concerning the cost per
tree planted, with the lowest bidder being selected to perform the work.
The price received by the rm per tree planted is called \the bid price."
Bidding on contracts takes place in the late autumn of the year preceding
the planting season which runs from early spring through to late summer.
Before the bidding takes place, the managers of the tree-planting rms
typically view the land to be planted and estimate the cost at which they
can complete the contract. This estimated cost depends on the expected
number of trees that a planter will be able to plant in a day which in turn
depends on the general conditions of the area to be planted.
Tree-planting rms are typically quite small, usually having fewer
than one hundred workers. These workers are generally paid using either
piece-rate contracts or xed-wage contracts. Under piece-rate contracts,
workers are paid in proportion to their output; generally, no explicit base
wage or production standard exists (although rms are governed by mini-
3
One hectare is an area 100 metres square, or 10,000 square metres. Thus, one
hectare is approximately 2.4711 acres.
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mum wage laws). Output is typically measured in terms of the number of
trees planted, although some area-based schemes are used as well.
4
Under
xed-wage contracts, worker pay is independent of output.
Tree-planting rms are mainly concerned with two aspects of worker
output: quantity and quality. While quantity is important for the obvious
reasons, the quality of planted seedlings determines the survival rate of
those seedlings. The survival of seedlings depends on several aspects
of the planting process. First, the planting spot must be acceptable.
Unacceptable sites include areas of depression that are subject to ooding,
areas next to major access roads, and areas under overhead obstacles that
would interfere with growth. Second, there must be adequate spacing both
between newly planted trees and between newly planted trees and existing
trees. Third, the actual planting spot must be prepared correctly; i.e., the
planting hole must be deep enough and wide enough to ensure that the
root system will not be damaged during planting. Finally, the seedling
must be placed vertically into the planting hole, so that the roots are not
folded over, and the hole must be lled back in and rmly tamped down.
These aspects of planting are monitored by the government or timber
harvesting company. Poorly planted trees can cause tree-planting rms
to be ned and can also hurt their chances of winning future contracts.
Firms can induce quality both by monitoring workers and by ning
them for poorly planted trees. Planters work under the direction of a
foreman who is responsible for monitoring the output of the workers. The
foreman's pay is usually related to the performance of the workers under
his direction, either in terms of a bonus or as residual claimant. Most
rms employ one monitor for about every ten workers and this ratio is
4
An area-based scheme is one under which workers are paid in proportion to the
area of land they plant in a given day.
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relatively constant across contracts. The schedule of nes is also relatively
constant across contracts. This practice is seemingly inconsistent with the
predictions of theoretical models of contracts which suggest that these
elements of the contract should vary in response to changing planting
conditions. One possible reason for keeping these elements constant is
that there may be transaction costs associated with changing them every
time conditions change.
5
The majority of planting is done under piece rates. Areas to be
planted are divided into plots. For each plot, the rm decides on a piece
rate. This piece rate takes into account the expected number of trees that
a planter will plant in a day and the expected wage of the worker. Thus,
the piece rate will be negatively correlated with the planting conditions.
Fixed wages tend to be paid when the conditions on the plot render piece
rates infeasible. For example, if the conditions render planting very slow
and dicult, then the value of the piece rate the rm must pay will be
very high. This, coupled with the fact that the worker may prefer to cheat
when planting is dicult, increases the value to the rm of a xed-wage
contract.
3. Theoretical Model
In our model, we consider the trade-o between quality and quantity
in the tree-planting industry. A worker's productivity is a function of
his eort level E and a productivity shock S. The productivity shock
represents planting conditions that are beyond the worker's control such
as the slope of the terrain, hardness of the ground, weather conditions,
and the amount of ground cover. Throughout our analysis we take the bid
5
For a related argument and evidence on the extent that transaction costs play in
determining the form of observed contracts, see Ferrall and Shearer (1994).
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price to be xed; i.e., the productivity shock is drawn after the bid price is
determined. This assumption captures the fact that planting conditions
can change between the time that contracts are viewed for bidding and
the time that planting takes place. Recall that the bidding takes place in
the autumn of the year preceding planting. Changes in the terrain could
occur, for example, due to severe weather blowing down existing trees or
due to the extent of the underbrush changing. Bid prices can vary across
contracts, something that will be accounted for in the empirical section
of the paper.
We assume that S has a log-normal distribution; i.e., logS is dis-
tributed normally with mean  and variance 
2
S
, so
f
S
(s) =
1
s
S


log s  

S

where  represents the standard normal probability density function. To
capture the eect of monitoring, we allow for a minimum level of eort e,
greater than zero, that is enforceable by the rm. This eort level ensures
that a certain number of trees are planted, and planted well. Beyond this
minimum level of productivity, the worker can choose to plant a number
of additional trees. Furthermore, he can choose to plant these additional
trees well or poorly. To keep the model simple, we restrict the choice to
be one or the other; i.e., the worker has discretion over the number of
additional trees to plant, but either he plants them all well or he plants
them all poorly. He cannot plant some of the extra trees well and some
of them poorly. The relative benets of planting well versus poorly will
depend on the manner in which workers are paid and the conditions under
which they are planting.
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Let the productivity of a worker be given by the production function
Y = Y
w
+ Y
p
;
Y
w
= s(e+E); (1)
E  0; Y
p
 0; EY
p
= 0;
where Y
w
is the number of well planted trees, Y
p
is the number of poorly
planted trees, and E is worker eort devoted to planting additional trees
well. Note that for s, a particular shock, e s trees will always be planted
well. The condition that EY
p
equals zero ensures that additional trees
are either planted well or planted poorly. Note also that the number of
poorly planted trees is independent of planting conditions. This reects
the fact that a worker can simply throw his trees away. For the same
reason, no additional eort is required to plant trees poorly.
The worker's choice variables are E and Y
p
; we denote the actual
choices of these variables as e and y
p
respectively. Furthermore, the
worker is restricted to make one of the following three choices:
(i) e = y
p
= 0 (provide only the minimum level of eort);
(ii) e = 0; y
p
> 0 (plant additional trees poorly);
(iii) e > 0; y
p
= 0 (plant additional trees well).
Trees that are planted poorly are detected with probability  by the
government.
6
In the event that poorly planted trees are detected, the
rm must pay a penalty Y
2
p
to the government. We also allow the rm
to collect a penalty Y
2
p
from the worker. While the rm may have some
6
We develop our model as a relationship between a tree-planting rm and the
government. In practice, tree-planting rms are also hired by private timber-harvesting
companies. Our analysis also applies to these relationships.
12
discretion over the choice of , we make the simplifying assumption that
the government chooses both  and . Given that the value of  is, in
practice, largely independent of working conditions, this assumption does
not appear restrictive. Note that  may also be interpreted to include
the cost of the loss of future reputation by the rm. Throughout the
analysis, we assume that the rm cannot pass their penalties onto the
workers completely; i.e.,  is less than .
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral. This allows us to focus on the
quality of output as the determinant of compensation system decisions,
while abstracting from questions of risk aversion. In addition, several
interviews with planters revealed that variation in their daily income was
not a major consideration to them. The utility of a worker is dened over
payment W , eort E, and poorly planted trees Y
p
by
U(W;E; Y
p
) =W   C(E; Y
p
):
The cost function is
C(E; Y
p
) =
8
<
:

2
(e+E
2
) if plant well;

2
e+ Y
2
p
otherwise.
Again, planting poorly involves no cost of eort beyond e since trees can
be thrown away. They do, however, imply a ne of Y
2
p
with probability
. The worker chooses his eort level, E, and the number of trees to
plant poorly, Y
p
, to maximize his utility after S is revealed. The worker's
alternative utility is denoted u.
The rm can pay the worker a piece rate, or xed wages; i.e.,
W =

Y if piece rates;
! if xed wages,
where ! is independent of output.
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The timing of the model is as follows:
0. the government chooses ; , and ;
1. the bid price P is determined at auction;
2. Nature chooses the pair (; 
2
S
), the parameters of the distribution
of S;
3. the rm observes (; 
2
S
), and then chooses a payment system and
its parameters; i.e., the xed wage ! or the piece rate ;
4. the worker observes (; 
2
S
), and then accepts or rejects the contract;
5. Nature chooses s;
6. the worker observes s, chooses to plant well or poorly, and chooses
an eort level producing output Y ;
7. the rm observes Y and pays wages.
Note that the parameters of the distribution of S are determined
after the bid price is xed. This reects the fact that planting condi-
tions can change between the time of bidding and the time of planting.
The parameters of the compensation system must be chosen based on the
new conditions (; 
2
S
) since workers base their labour supply decisions on
these conditions; i.e., the parameters of the compensation system must
satisfy the worker's labour supply constraint. Furthermore, we assume
that workers are mobile: to wit, the expected utility constraint is bind-
ing. This implies that the worker is indierent ex ante between planting
under piece rates and xed wages. This assumption simplies the analy-
sis considerably and also seems consistent with observed practice in the
tree-planting industry. Interviews with managers of tree-planting rms
revealed that piece rates are set to ensure that workers earn a certain
amount of money, on average, per day. This suggests that the expected
utility constraint is a binding consideration in the setting of piece rates.
We do not, however, impose a constraint on expected prots. This re-
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ects the fact that our analysis is conditional on the bid price. Also, rms
typically plant in a number of areas, each of which has a dierent contract
associated with it. Prots need not be positive for each area planted, only
on average across all of the contracts.
To solve the model, we work backwards. First, we solve for the
worker's optimal action within each compensation system, and then we
solve the rm's optimal choice of a compensation system, taking the re-
action of the worker as given.
Worker's Problem
(a) Fixed Wages.
Under xed wages, the worker will always supply the minimum level of
eort e. Since his wage is independent of output, there is no benet to
planting extra trees (either well or poorly), and both actions would entail a
cost. Planting well entails an extra eort cost, and planting poorly entails
a ne (with probability ). Both reduce utility. The wage is determined
by the expected utility constraint. Letting !^ denote the wage that solves
this constraint, we have
!^ =

2
e+ u: (2)
(b) Piece Rates.
Under piece rates, the worker has an incentive to plant trees in excess of
e s, since he is paid according to his output. However, the worker must
decide whether to plant these trees well or to plant them poorly. This
decision will depend on the indirect utility of each option.
Consider rst the option of planting trees well.
W = (e+E)s
U = (e+E)s 

2
(e+E
2
):
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After observing s, the worker chooses eort E to equate his marginal
benet of eort to his marginal cost when
e =
s

;
giving indirect utility of
V
w
= (s 

2
)e+

2
s
2
2
:
If the worker plants poorly, then
W = (es+ Y
p
)  Y
2
p
U = (es+ Y
p
)  Y
2
p
 

2
e:
The worker chooses Y
p
to maximize his utility at
y
p
=

2
;
giving indirect utility
V
p
= (s 

2
)e+

2
4
:
Note that V
p
is independent of conditions beyond the minimum enforce-
able eort level. This is because the worker can simply throw his trees
away.
Conditional on s, the worker will plant well when
V
w
> V
p
(s 

2
)e+

2
s
2
2
> (s  

2
)e+

2
4
or
s >
r

2
= s

:
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The optimal decision rule of the worker is summarized in Figure 1. The
worker plants well when s exceeds s

(i.e., when conditions are good)
and plants poorly when s is less than s

(i.e., when conditions are bad).
This result obtains because the value of planting poorly is independent
of conditions. On the other hand, poor conditions reduce the value of
planting trees well as the time and eort required to do so become more
costly. This raises the relative value of planting poorly. Note that the
value of s

is independent of  since the piece rate is applied to the total
number of trees planted independent of their quality.
In order for a worker to accept the contract, it must meet his expected
utility constraint. Since the worker's decision to accept or to reject the
contract is made before the value of s is revealed, this constraint will
depend on the probability that the planter will plant well. Let q denote
the probability the worker plants well; i.e.,
q = Pr[S > s

] = [1  F
S
(s

)]:
The expected utility constraint for piece-rate contracts is
e E [S] +
q


2
E [S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
2

2
 
q
2

2
E [S
2
jS > s

] 
(1  q)
4

2
 

2
e = u;
where E denotes the expectations operator. The rst three terms are
the expected gross wages. The fourth term is the expected eort cost
of planting trees well. The fth term is the expected ne due to poorly
planted trees, and the sixth term is the cost of enforceable eort. Re-
arranging, gives
eE [S] +
q
2

2
E [S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
4

2
=

2
e+ u = !^; (3)
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where !^ is the xed wage that would give the worker the same level of
utility from (2).
We restrict ourselves to the economically relevant solutions of (3) for
which  exceeds zero and denote this solution as ^(; 
S
; ; p; ) or ^ for
short.
Lemma 1
The value of ^ that solves (3) is unique.
The proof of this lemma, like the proofs of all of our results, is contained
in the Appendix.
Using the quadratic formula, it is straight forward to derive the fol-
lowing solution for ^;
^ =
 eE [S] +
s
e
2
 
E [S]

2
+

2q

E [S
2
jS > s

] +
(1 q)



2
e+ u

q

E [S
2
jS > s

] +
(1 q)
2
:
(4)
We now derive conditions under which d^=d is less than zero.
Lemma 2
If the slope of the secant of the hazard function, evaluated between the
points
log s

  

S
  2
S
and
log s

  

S
is less than 1 + ;  > 0; then
d^
d
< 0.
In general, this condition states that the hazard function of the log-
normal distribution must not be increasing too quickly. An increase in
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 will have opposing eects on expected income. First, it increases the
worker's expected income from planting trees well. Second, it reduces the
probability that he will plant poorly and so decreases the probability that
he will receive (=2). If the hazard function is increasing very quickly,
then increasing  decreases Pr [SjS > s

] very quickly and the expected
income from planting trees well receives less weight in the utility function.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that d^=d is less than zero in
accordance with observed practice in the rm.
Note that expected wages under piece rates
 
E [W jp:r:]

are
E [W jp:r:] = ^eE [S] + q
^
2

E [S
2
jS > s

] + (1  q)
^
2
2
: (5)
Denoting the expected wage given xed wages as E [W jf:w:] equal to !^,
and using (3)
E [W jp:r:] = E [W jf:w:] + q
^
2
2
E [S
2
jS > s

] + (1  q)
^
2
4
: (6)
Thus, expected wages under piece rates are higher than under xed wages.
The dierence in expected wages compensates the worker for his extra
costs under piece rates. There are two components to these costs. First,
with probability q, the worker will supply a higher level of eort equal to
(^s=) towards planting trees well. The cost of this eort to the worker
is (^
2
s
2
=2). Second, with probability (1   q), the worker will plant
(^=2) trees poorly. These poorly planted trees will be detected with
probability  implying an expected ne to the worker of (^
2
=4). The
expected extra cost to the worker of planting under piece rates is
q
^
2
2
E [S
2
jS > s

] + (1  q)
^
2
4
:
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Firm's Problem
Taking the worker's reaction as given, the rm will choose to pay piece
rates or xed wages depending on the expected prots of each. Recall
that p, the price per tree or bid price, received by the rm for planted
trees is xed.
(a) Expected Prots under Fixed Wages.
Given the worker always provides the minimum level of eort e under
xed wages, the expected prots per worker are
E [Profitsjf:w:; p; ; 
S
] = p E [eS]  !^:
(b) Expected Prots under Piece Rates.
Expected prots (conditional on S being s) given the worker plants well
are
(p  ^)(e+ e)s = (p  ^)(e+
^s

)s:
If the worker plants poorly, then prots (conditional on S being s) are
(p ^)es+(p ^)y
p
+( )y
2
p
= (p ^)es+(p ^)
^
2
+( )
^
2
4
2

2
:
Thus, expected prots from paying piece rates are
E [Profitsjp:r:; p; ; 
S
] = q

(p  ^)

e E [SjS > s

] +
^

E [S
2
jS > s

]

+ (1  q)

(p  ^)eE [SjS < s

] + (p  ^)
^
2
+ (   )
^
2
4
2

2

:
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(c) Choice of Payment System.
Having observed the parameters of the distribution of S, the rm will
choose to pay piece rates if and only if the expected prots from doing so
are larger than the expected prots from paying xed wages; i.e.,
q

(p  ^)

eE [SjS > s

] +
^

E [S
2
jS > s

]

+ (1  q)

(p  ^)e E [SjS < s

] + (p  ^)
^
2
+ (   )
^
2
4
2

2

> ep E [S]  !^:
But from (3),
!^ = ^e E [S] +
q
2
^
2
E [S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
4
^
2
:
Making the appropriate substitution and rearranging gives
qp
^

E [S
2
jS > s

] + (1  q)p
^
2
> q
^
2
2
E [S
2
jS > s

]+
(1  q)
^
2
4
+ (1  q)(   )
^
2
4
2

2
: (7)
The left hand side of (7) is the value of extra output the worker
produces under piece rates. The rst term is the price times expected
number of well planted trees and the second term is the price times the
expected number of poorly planted trees. The rst two terms on the right
hand side are the extra compensation that must be paid to the worker to
compensate him for the extra eort he supplies under piece rates. The
third term on the right hand side is the expected net ne that the rm
must pay for poorly planted trees.
Lemma 3
A necessary condition for the rm to pay piece rates is ^  2p.
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If the piece rate required to meet the expected utility constraint is
too large relative to the bid price, then the rm will prefer to pay xed
wages. Note, there is no constraint that p exceed ^ here since there is no
zero prot constraint. To understand this result, note that the value of
the extra output the worker produces under piece-rates is
p
^

Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds+ (1  q)p
^
2
:
The extra wage that the rm must pay to compensate the worker for his
additional eort is
^
2
2
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds+ (1  q)
^
2
4
:
Taking the dierence between the two shows that the compensating wage
dierential is greater than the added productivity when ^ exceeds 2p.
Under these circumstances, the rm will never want to pay piece rates.
Lemma 4.
If the worker plants extra trees poorly with probability one, then the rm
will pay piece rates only if ^ <
2

p.
To interpret Lemma 4, note that rearranging (7) gives
q
(1  q)
>
(   )
^
4
2

2
 
 
p 
^
2

1
2
 
p 
^
2

1

E [S
2
jS > s

]
: (8)
The numerator on the right hand side of (8) is the net benet to the
rm of the worker cheating. If the rm earns a net gain when the worker
cheats, then the rm will always prefer to pay piece rates since there is
no added cost to doing so and worker productivity is higher. Rearranging
this term yields that piece rates will always be preferred if
(   )
^
2
4
2

2
+
^
2
4
< p

2
:
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The left hand side is the extra cost to the rm of worker cheating
consisting of the ne the rm must pay to the government plus the extra
compensation the rm pays to the worker to compensate him for his ne.
The right hand side is the extra benet to the rm of the worker cheating.
It is the value of the poorly planted trees that are not detected by the
government. If, for example, the rm could pass all the ne onto the
workers (i.e.,  equal to ), then the rm would pay piece rates whenever
2p exceeds ^, as the rm would bear no cost in the event the worker
cheated.
Lemmata 3 and 4 give the extreme cases of selecting a payment
scheme. We now turn to the intermediate case of ^ between (2p=)
and 2p. Note that this set of ^s is not empty since  exceeds  by as-
sumption. Rearranging (8), piece rates will be paid when
(1  q) 

p 
^
2

1

R
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds
1
2

(   )

2
 
 
p 
^
2


:
The rm will pay xed wages when the probability of cheating becomes
too high. Recall that ^; q; and
R
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds are functions of  and p (we
take 
S
; ; ; ; and  to be xed).
Dene
 (jp)  (1  q) 

p 
^
2

1

R
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds
1
2

(   )

2
 
 
p 
^
2


: (9)
Note that the rule for the rm is now
system of pay =

xed wages if  (jp) > 0
piece rates if  (jp)  0:
Denote 

(p) to be that value of  that solves  (

jp) equals zero given
; ; ; ; and 
S
. At a given bid price p, the rm is indierent between
23
paying piece rates and xed wages along 

(p). We now consider the
properties of  (jp).
Theorem 1
 (jp) is monotonically decreasing in  if
d^
d
< 0.
Theorem 1 demonstrates how general planting conditions aect the form
of compensation system chosen by the rm for a given contract. Intu-
itively, two things occur when general planting conditions are poor, (i.e.,
the value of  is low) both of which render piece rates less attractive
to rms. First, since poor conditions reduce the expected payment the
worker will receive under piece rates, the value of ^ must rise relative to
p to meet the expected utility constraint. Second, since low values of S
are more likely when  is low, the probability that the worker will cheat
increases. The graph of  (jp) is presented in Figure 2. Note that there
is a range of distributions, where 

(p) exceeds , for which the rm will
pay xed wages and a range of distributions, where  exceeds 

(p), for
which the rm will pay piece rates.
4. Implications of the Model
In order to discuss the empirical implications of the model, we must
account for the fact that the bid price can dier across observed contracts.
Interviews with the rm manager revealed that it is equally likely that
changing conditions lead the rm to pay xed wages on any contract.
Therefore, we assume that the distribution of bid prices is independent of
the payment system. We denote the density of bid prices as f
P
(p).
Assumption 1
f
P
(pj > 

(p)) = f
P
(p) and f
P
(pj < 

(p)) = f
P
(p).
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Note that Assumption 1 does not rule out a correlation between  and P
since 

is a function of p as well.
Given Assumption 1, we can nd the expected productivity of a
worker given the rm paid piece rates. Recall that the expected produc-
tivity given piece rates and  is
E [Y jp:r:; ] = eE [Sj]+
^

Pr[S > s

] E [S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
Pr[S < s

j]:
To nd the expected productivity given piece rates, we simply integrate
this term over all values of P and  for which the rm paid piece rates.
E [Y jp:r:] =
Z
P

Z


Z
Y
yf
Y
(yjp:r:; ; p)dy

g

(jp:r:; p)d

f
P
(p)dp
=
Z
P

Z
1


(p)

eE [Sj] +
^

Pr[S > s

] E [S
2
jS > s

; ]
+
^
2
Pr[S < s

j]

g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

f
P
(p)dp; (10)
where G

((p)) and g

(jp) represent respectively the cumulative dis-
tribution and probability density functions of  conditional on P being
p.
To nd the incentive eect on these contracts, we subtract the ex-
pected productivity the worker would have produced under these same
conditions had he been paid xed wages.
The expected productivity conditional on xed wages and  is
E [Y jf:w:; ] = e E [Sj]
integrating this term over all P and all  exceeding 

(p) gives the desired
term
Z
P

Z
1


(p)
E [Y jf:w:; ]
g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

f
P
(p)dp
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ZP

Z
1


(p)
eE [Sj]
g

(jp))
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

f
P
(p)dp: (11)
Subtracting (11) from (10) gives the incentive eect for piece-rate con-
tracts, denoted H ; viz.,
H =
Z
P

Z
1


(p)
h(; p)d

f
P
(p)dp;
where
h(; p) =

^

Pr[S > s

j] E [S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
Pr[S < s

j]

g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
:
Theorem 1 suggests that a regression of productivity on the system
of pay will not, in general, give an unbiased estimate of H . In order
to measure such an eect, we would need to hold everything but the
payment system constant, and then compare productivity under piece
rates to productivity under xed wages. Yet Theorem 1 implies that
average conditions are not the same in observed piece rate contracts as
they are in observed xed wage contracts, and these average conditions
aect worker productivity: observed productivity is lower under xed
wages than piece rates for two reasons. The rst is the incentive eect;
i.e., for any given set of conditions, workers have less incentive to work
hard under xed wages. The second is the treatment eect; i.e., it is
poor conditions that lead the rm to pay xed wages. The dierence in
observed productivity encompasses these two eects. A simple regression
comparing productivity under the two systems will not be able to identify
separately the eect of the payment system on output from the eect of
the conditions on output. We are, however, able to bound the size of the
incentive eect. Theorem 2 and its corollaries develop this argument.
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Theorem 2
The dierence in observed real wages between piece-rate and xed-wage
contracts will be smaller than the dierence in observed productivity be-
tween these same contracts.
Comparing across payment schemes, productivity dierences will be larger
than the dierence in real wages. The expected utility constraint implies
that the xed wage is independent of planting conditions. Even though
productivity will be low under xed wages (both because the conditions
are poor and the lack of incentives provided to the worker) the rm must
pay a wage that will satisfy the expected utility constraint in order to
keep the worker at the rm. The rm can reduce the wage of the worker
in response to the incentive eect; i.e., since the worker will supply less
eort he no longer requires a compensating dierential, yet the mobility
of workers implies that the rm must absorb the loss of productivity due
to the poor conditions.
Furthermore, we can bound the gain in productivity induced by pay-
ing workers piece rates rather than xed wages.
Corollary 2.1
The productivity gain induced by paying workers piece rates on the set of
contracts  > 

(p) is bounded from above by the dierence in observed
productivity between piece-rate and xed-wage contracts.
Corollary 2.2
The productivity gain induced by paying workers piece rates on the set of
contracts  > 

(p) is bounded from below by the dierence in observed
real wages between piece-rate and xed-wage contracts.
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The actual observed dierence in productivity comprises two eects: the
reduced eort of the workers due to the reduction in incentives, and the
reduced productivity due to the poor conditions. Corollary 2.1 merely
recognizes that the sum of these two eects must be at least as large as
the incentive eect itself. Corollary 2.2 follows from the labour supply
constraint of the worker and Lemma 3. The fact that xed wages are
independent of conditions implies that the xed wage we observe is the
same xed wage as would be paid on contracts for which  exceeds 

(p).
From the labour supply constraint, the dierence between xed wages and
the piece rate wages reects the the compensating dierential associated
with the incentive eect. This compensating dierential must be less than
the incentive eect or the rm would never have paid piece rates on these
contracts.
6. Data and Results
Our data come from the payroll records of a tree-planting rm lo-
cated in British Columbia. In 1991, this rm paid its workers both piece
rates and xed wages. When workers planted under piece rates, the data
contain daily information on the piece rate received by each worker and
the number of trees the worker planted. When workers planted under
xed wages, the data contain daily information on the number of trees
planted and the wage received. The planting season of this rm covers a
period of nearly six months.
We include in our study only those workers who are observed planting
under both piece rates and xed wages. This gives us 983 observations on
17 workers of which 197 observations are under xed wages and 786 are
under piece rates. The data are summarized in Table 1. In the rst part
of the table, we summarize the data on the wages received, productivity
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(trees planted per day) and total wages under xed-wage contracts (total
wages are simply equal to the xed wage in this case). In the second
part of the table, we present data from the piece-rate contracts. In the
rst column, we summarize data concerning the piece rates received by
workers, while in the second column we summarize the number of trees
planted. In the third column, we summarize total wages, and in the
fourth, we convert total wages to real values.
Our calculations of real wages were hampered by the fact that no
data concerning the exact bid price are available. Yet interviews with
rm managers revealed that the bid price is usually between 1.85 and
1.95 times the piece rate paid to workers. Therefore, we discount total
wages received on piece-rate contracts by (1:90 ). Discounting wages
from xed-wage contracts is somewhat more problematic since we have
no information on  for these contracts. Therefore, we use (1:90  )
as a discount factor, where  is the average value of  observed in the
data. Note, that since conditions on piece-rate contracts will, on aver-
age, tend to be better than those on xed-wage contracts, (1:90 ) will
tend to under-estimate the true price per tree received on these contracts.
In turn, we will tend to over-estimate the real wage on xed-wage con-
tracts and consequently, we tend to under-estimate the dierence in real
wages. In this manner, our resulting estimate of the lower bound should
be considered conservative.
In general, the planters were paid very well. The average daily wage
was $224.55 under xed wages and $242.52 under piece rates. Not ev-
eryone, however, enjoyed success on the job. For example, one individual
earned only $24 for a day of planting. Note that both the mean and stan-
dard deviation of trees planted is higher under piece rates (977.09, 419.10)
than under xed wages (614.43, 245.7) as is expected. Similarly, the total
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wage received is higher under piece rates than xed wages reecting the
compensating dierential paid to workers.
The large amount of variability in both trees planted and total wages
suggests that individual heterogeneity may be important. To investigate
this further, in Table 2 we present summary statistics concerning the
number of trees planted per individual, ordered according to average (from
lowest to highest). The rst column shows the average number of trees
planted per day, the second the standard deviation, the third and fourth
give the maximum and minimum number of trees planted, and the fth
column shows the number of observations on each worker. Note that the
average number of trees planted per day ranges from 442.5 to 1158, which
underlines the importance of individual heterogeneity. A histogram of
these average values is presented in Figure 3.
The Upper Bound.
Corollary 2.1 implies that the observed dierence in average productivity
between piece-rate contracts and xed-wage contracts provides an upper
bound to the incentive eect for piece-rate contracts. In order to calculate
this dierence in mean productivity, we regress daily productivity on an
individual-specic constant and a dummy variable indicating xed-wage
contracts. The estimated equation is
Y
i;t
= 
0;i
+ 
1
D
i;t
+ 
Y;i;t
;
where Y
i;t
is the number of trees planted on day t by individual i; the
constant term 
0;i
is possibly individual specic; and D
i;t
is an indica-
tor variable equal to one if individual i was planting under a xed-wage
contract on day t. Covariates are not generally available for the planters.
However, given the short duration of the sample period, much of the
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variation in individual characteristics can be captured by the individual
specic eect.
Results from regressing the number of trees planted on the payment
system are presented in Table 3. Note that average productivity under
xed-wage contracts is approximately 362.67 trees below that of piece-
rate contracts. In Table 4, we present results from the same regression,
while controlling for individual-specic eects. To minimize the length
of the table, we present simply the maximum, minimum, and average
values of the individual-specic eects. A test of the hypothesis that
these eects are zero has an F-statistic of 12.24; with 16 restrictions, the
p-value is equal to zero. Controlling for individual-specic eects increases
the dierence in productivity between xed-wage and piece-rate contracts
to 366.2 trees per day.
The Lower Bound.
To estimate the lower bound, we regress daily real wages on a constant
term and a dummy variable indicating xed wage contracts. The esti-
mating equation now becomes
W
i;t
= '
0;i
+ '
1
D
i;t
+ 
W;i;t
;
where W
i;t
is the real wage received (expressed in terms of trees) on day
t by individual i; the constant term '
0;i
is possibly individual-specic;
and D
i;t
is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i was planting
under a xed-wage contract on day t.
The results from regressing the daily real wage on the payment sys-
tem are presented in Table 5. Note that the average real wage decreases
by 59.71 trees under xed wages. Again, including individual-specic
eects increases this dierential. These results are presented in Table
31
6. Here, the dierence in average real wages is calculated to be 60.56
trees. An F-test of the restrictions that the individual-specic constants
are insignicant is easily rejected, having a test statistic of 13.12 with 16
restrictions, so the p-value is zero.
7. Structural Estimation
In order to measure the incentive eect more precisely, we estimate
the model structurally. In particular, we take the model developed in
Section 3 as the data generating process and we estimate its parameters.
We do not consider individual-specic eects since their inclusion had
only marginal eects on the calculation of the upper and lower bounds to
the incentive eect. We use the model to generate 

and s

endogenously
as functions of the structural parameters.
The parameters to be estimated are the following:
1. 

, the mean of ;
2. 
2

, the variance of ;
3. e, the minimum eort level;
4. 
2
S
, the variance of S;
5. , the cost of eort;
6. 2, the worker's expected ne for poorly planted trees;
7. , the rm's share of nes for poorly planted trees.
We denote the vector of these parameters as . Note s

, the cut-o
point for cheating on the distribution of S, is equal to
p
(=2), so it is
simply a ratio of these two parameters.
We make the following distributional assumptions:
Assumption A1:   N(

; 
2

);
Assumption A2: S  logN(; 
2
S
).
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Similarly, we make the following identication assumptions:
Assumption A3: 

= 0;
Assumption A4: 
2
S
is constant across contracts;
Assumption A5: Each contract is the same size;
Assumption A6: P is constant across contracts;
Assumption A7:  =   ;  > 1;
Assumption A8: u = 0.
Assumption A5 implies that the number of man days worked on each
contract is the same. Therefore, the ratio of the number of observations of
xed-wage planting to the total number of observations will identify the
probability of paying xed wages. As much as possible, rms do try to
make sites of comparable size. Assumption A6 simplies the estimation in
that there is only one 

to solve for in the rm's problem. Assumption A7
implies that we only identify  as a multiple of . Finally, Assumption A8
species that the worker's alternative utility is equal to zero, an innocuous
normalization.
We estimate the structural parameters by matching the population
moments that are implied by the model to the sample moments of our
data. Note that we lack data on the quality of output. This implies that
the distribution of output under piece rates is a mixture of the distribu-
tions of output when the worker plants well and when he plants poorly.
The derivation of the population moments is provided in the Ap-
pendix. We denote sample equivalents of population moments with bars.
Thus y
fw
is the average productivity under xed wages observed in the
sample. Furthermore, we denote the dierence between population mo-
ments and sample equivalents by m. We consider the following moment
conditions:
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m1
= 



  




 
n
f:w:
n
f:w:
+ n
p:r:
;
m
2
= E [Y jf:w:]  y
f:w:
;
m
3
= E [Y
2
jf:w:]   y
2
f:w:
;
m
4
= E [Y jp:r:]  y
p:r:
;
m
5
= E [Y
2
jp:r:]  y
2
p:r:
;
m
6
= E [W jf:w:]  w
f:w:
;
m
7
= E [W jp:r:]  w
p:r:
;
m
8
= E [jp:r:]  
p:r:
:
We match the rst two moments of productivity under both xed
wages and piece rates, the rst moment of wages under both xed wages
and piece rates, the rst moment of the piece rates paid to the workers and
the proportion of observations that are paid xed wages. We impose that
the s in the population moments satisfy the worker's expected utility
constraint (4) and that 

solve  () equals zero where  () is dened
in (9).
The parameters are estimated by minimizing the function
m
>
b


 1
m
wherem represents the vector of stacked moment conditions and
b

 is the
estimated variance-covariance matrix of the moments. We calculated
b


using the variance-covariancematrix of the sample moments and imposing
the condition that the covariance between piece-rate moments and xed-
wage moments is zero.
7
The variance-covariance matrix of the parameter
estimates,
b
, is given byG
>
b


 1
G, whereG is a matrix with typical entry
G
i;j
=
@m
i
@
j
:
7
See Greene (1993) pp. 372-374.
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Results from this procedure are presented in Table 7.
The estimated incentive eect on piece-rate contracts,
b
H , equals
88.53 trees. This number lies within the previously estimated upper and
lower bounds and suggests that 24% of the observed dierence in aver-
age productivity between piece rate and xed wage contracts (366 trees)
is due to incentives, the rest is due to dierences in planting conditions.
Furthermore, these results suggest that 9.1% of the observed productivity
under piece rates (977 trees) is due to incentives.
8. Discussion and Conclusion
Empirical work in economics often suers from a lack of experimental
data. The comparison of worker productivity across payment systems is
no dierent in this respect. The fact that rms choose their payment
system suggests that the observed payment system may be endogenous
and cause biased estimation results. We have modelled the tree-planting
rm's choice of compensation system as a function of working conditions.
An important result of our model is that rms are more likely to choose
xed-wage contracts when working conditions render planting dicult.
This is because workers will tend to plant poorly when conditions are
bad, exposing the rm to nes from the government.
Explicit modelling of the rm's choice process provides benets at
dierent levels. First, we are able to demonstrate why a simple compari-
son of average productivity between dierent compensation systems fails
to identify the incentive eect. Second, the model allows us to bound the
size of the incentive eect in terms of dierences in observed variables;
viz., average productivity and average real wages. We estimate the upper
bound to the incentive eect to be 366 trees per day and the lower bound
to be 60 trees per day. Given that average productivity under piece rates
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was 977 trees planted per day, this suggests that incentives are responsible
for between 6% and 37% of this productivity. Third, the explicit modelling
of behaviour enables us to estimate the model structurally and to measure
more precisely the eect of incentives on productivity. Our results suggest
that the incentive eect accounts for only 24% of the observed dierence
in average productivity between piece-rate and xed-wage contracts (366
trees). This highlights the problem of endogeneity in the comparison of
worker productivity across dierent compensation systems.
Finally, our results conrm the presence of an incentive eect; i.e.,
workers are more productive under piece rates than under xed wages. It
would be incorrect, however, to conclude that piece rates are better than
xed wages. The rm in our model chooses xed wages or piece rates as a
rational prot-maximizing response to planting conditions: under certain
conditions, the gain in productivity is overridden by quality concerns,
leading the rm to choose xed wages. Therefore, our estimated incentive
eect is an estimate of the output foregone when making such a choice.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Dene
G()  e E[S] +
q
2

2
E[S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
4

2
 

2
e  u:
The proof follows from that fact that G
0
() > 0 for  > 0 and
G(0) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Recall that the expected utility constraint satises
^e E[S] +
^
2
2
q E[S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
4
^
2
 

2
e = u:
Totally dierentiating this expression gives
d^
d
=  
^e
@ E[S]
@
+
^
2
2
q
@
@
E[S
2
jS > s

] +
h
^
2
2
E[S
2
jS > s

] 
^
2
4
i
@q
@
eE[S] +
^

q E[S
2
jS > s

] +
(1 q)
2
^
:
(A.1)
A sucient condition for (A.1) to be negative is for the numer-
ator,
^e
@ E[S]
@
+
^
2
2
q
@
@
E[S
2
jS > s

] +
"
^
2
2
E[S
2
jS > s

] 
^
2
4
#
@q
@
> 0:
(A.2)
This expression has three parts. The rst part is positive since
E[S] equals exp

+ 
2
S
=2

. The third part is also positive. To
see this note that
q = 1  F (s

) = 1 

log s

  

S

)
@q
@
=
1

S


log s

  

S

> 0:
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As well,
^
2
2
E[S
2
jS > s

] 
^
2
4
 0
since
E[S
2
jS > s

] 

2
= (s

)
2
:
To complete the proof we make the following denitions.

1
 
 
log(s

)    2
2
S

S
!
;

2
 
 
log(s

)  

S
!
;

1
 
 
log(s

)    2
2
S

S
!

2
 
 
log(s

)  

S
!
;
 
2
^
2

^e
@ E[S]
@
+
"
^
2
2
E[S
2
jS > s

] 
^
2
4
#
@q
@

> 0:
The numerator is positive if
@ E[S
2
jS > s

]
@
+

(1 
2
)
> 0
or

2(1 
1
) +

1

S

(1 
2
) 

2

S
(1 
1
)

exp

2+2
2
S

(1 
2
)
2
+

(1 
2
)
> 0:
Rearranging gives
2
S
+

1
(1 
1
)
 

2
(1 
2
)
+

S
(1 
1
)
 exp

 2(+ 
2
S
)

> 0
or

2
(1 
2
)
 

1
(1 
1
)
2
S
< 1+
1
(1 
1
)
exp
h
 2(+ 
2
S
)
i

2
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the left hand side of which is the slope of the secant of the
hazard function evaluated at the points
log(s

)  

S
and
log(s

)  

S
  2
S
:
Proof of Lemma 3.
Rearranging (7) gives
q


p 
^
2

E[S
2
jS > s

] +
(1  q)
2

p 
^
2

>
(1  q)^
4
2

2
(   );
which can only be satised if ^ < 2p.
Proof of Lemma 4.
The proof follows directly from evaluating (7) with q = 0.
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Proof of Theorem 1.
Throughout the proof, we make use of the following properties
of the log-normal distribution:
E[S] = exp

+ 
2
S
=2

(A.3)
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds = exp

2+ 2
2
S

"
1 
 
log(s

)    2
2
S

S
!#
(A.4)
F
S
(s

) = 
 
log(s

)  

S
!
(A.5)
where  denotes the cumulative standard normal density.
Dierentiating  with respect to  gives
 
0
() =  
dq
d
 

1


p 
^
2

d
d
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds 
1
2
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds
d^
d



1
2

(   )
^
2
  (p  ^=2)

 

1
2

(   )
1
2
+
1
2

d^
d



1


p 
^
2

Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds

1
h
1
2

(   )
^
2
  (p  ^=2)
i
2
: (A.6)
Recall
q = 1  F
S
(s

) = 1 
 
log(s

)  

S
!
;
and
dq
d
=
1

S

 
log(s

)  

S
!
;
so the rst term in (A.6) is negative. The sign of the second
term depends on its numerator which can be broken into three
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parts as follows.
 

1


p 
^
2

d
d
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds


1
2

(   )
^
2
  (p  ^=2)

(A.6.a)
+

1
2
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds
d^
d


1
2

(   )
^
2
  (p  ^=2)

(A.6.b)
+
1
2

(   )
1
2
+
1
2

d^
d

1


p 
^
2

Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds

(A.6.c)
The term (A.6.a) is negative since
Z
1
s

s
2
f
S
(s)ds = exp

2+2
2
S

"
1 
 
log(s

)    2
2
S

S
!#
;
and its derivative with respect to  is positive. The terms
(A.6.b) and (A.6.c) are negative if
d^
d
< 0: It follows immedi-
ately that a sucient condition for  
0
() < 0 is for
d^
d
< 0:
Proof of Theorem 2
Equations (5) and (6) in the text calculate the expected wages
under piece rates and xed wages for a given value of . We
rewrite (5) and (6) making the dependence on  explicit.
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E[W jf:w:; ] = !^ = ^e E[Sj] +
^
2
2
Pr[S > s

j] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
Pr[S < s

j]
^
2
4
(A.7)
E[W jp:r:; ] = ^e E[Sj] +
^
2

Pr[S > s

j] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
Pr[S < s

j]
^
2
2
(A.8)
To calculate the the expected real wages under piece rates and
xed wages, conditional on the rm's choice of payment sys-
tem, we integrate over all values of p and  that cause the rm
to pay one system or the other. Recall that the rm chooses
piece rates whenever  > 

(p). expected real wages given that
the rm chose to pay piece rates are therefore
E[W jp:r:] =
Z
P

Z
1


(p)

^e E[Sj] +
^
2

Pr[S > s

j] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
2
Pr[S < s

j]

g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

1
p
f
P
(p)dp; (A.9)
where G

((p)) and g

(jp) represent the distribution function
and density of  conditional on p. Similarly, expected wages
given the rm chose xed wages are E[W jf:w:] which equals !^
which is constant for all  greater than 

(p) Using (A.7) we
can write
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E[W jf:w:] =
Z
P

Z
1


(p)

^eE[Sj] +
^
2
2
Pr[S > s

j] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
4
Pr[S < s

j]

g

()
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

1
p
f
P
(p)dp; (A.10)
Subtracting (A.10) from (A.9) gives the dierence in observed
wages under the two payment schemes. Dene
h(; p) =

^

Pr[S > s

j] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
Pr[S < s

j]

g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
;
then
E[W jp:r:]  E[W jf:w:] =
Z
P
(
Z
1


(p)
^
2p
h(; p)d
)
f
P
(p)dp: (A.11)
Consider now a comparison of productivity under the two
schemes. Under piece rates, expected productivity conditional
on  is
E[Y jp:r:; ] = eE[Sj] +
^

Pr[S > s

] E[S
2
jS > s

; ]+
^
2
Pr[S < s

j]:
Expected productivity conditional on the the rm paying piece
rates is
E[Y jp:r:] =
Z
P

Z
1


(p)
E[Y jp:r:; ]
g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p))]
d

f
P
(p)dp
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
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] E[S
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jS > s

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2
Pr[S < s
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j]

g

(jp)
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
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(p))]
d

f
P
(p)dp: (A.12)
Under xed wages, expected productivity conditional on  is
E[Y jf:w:; ] = eE[Sj]
and expected productivity conditional on the rm paying xed
wages is
E[Y jf:w:] =
Z
P
(
Z


(p)
 1
E[Y jf:w:; ]
g

(jp)
[1 G

(

(p)]
d
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f
P
(p)dp
=
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Z


(p)
 1
e E[Sj]
g

(jp))
G

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(p))
d
)
f
P
(p)dp: (A.13)
Subtracting (A.13) from (A.12) gives the dierence in observed
productivity under the two payment schemes
E[Y jp:r:]  E[Y jf:w:] =
Z
P

Z
1


(p)
h(; p)d

f
P
(p)dp
+e

Z
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
Z
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(p)
E[Sj]
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(jp)
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(
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(p))]
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Z

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(p)
 1
E[Sj]
g

(jp)
G

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(p))
d

f
P
(p)dp

(A.14)
Since the second term of (A.14) is positive, (A.14) will be larger
than (A.11) if
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Z
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h(; p)d
)
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A sucient condition for this to hold is for
Z
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(p)
h(; p)d 
Z
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
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^
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h(; p)d 8p;
and a sucient condition for this to hold is for
h(; p) 
^
2p
h(; p) 8  > 

(p);
or for
^  2p 8  > 

(p)
which must hold by Lemma 3.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
The expected productivity under piece rates for the contracts
 > 

(p) is
Z
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Z
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The expected productivity under xed wages for these same
contracts is
Z
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The dierence in expected productivity is therefore
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From (A.14), the dierence in observed average productivity
under the two payment schemes is
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:
Proof of Corollary 2.2
From (A.11), the dierence in observed wages is
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which holds by Lemma 3.
Derivation of Moments
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All integrals were simulated by drawing 20,000 random num-
bers from a normal distribution, truncated from below at 

.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Fixed Wages
Real WageTotalTreesWages
454.55224.55614.43224.55Mean
91.2945.09245.745.09Std.
566.802801575280Max
188.269310093Min
197197197197Obs
Piece Rates
Real WageTotalTreesRate
514.26242.52977.090.27Mean
220.6071.03419.100.08Std. Dev
1184.2150422500.45Max
39.4724750.15Min
786786786786Obs
Table 2: Average Daily Productivity by Individual Planter
MaximumMinimumStd DevAverageObservationsIndividual
840120169.56442.50241
1860100398.48662.89382
126075284.34671.05663
170090330.74739.63514
144080346.01780.11455
1620205313.11816.42536
180085363.05844.93717
2100185378.90857.30708
1720200344.74882.88529
1620200350.54884.577010
1820125430.00967.134711
1880120348.46971.328512
1940130440.96995.426213
1640220407.611000.854714
2200150520.001094.427415
2250410456.211142.146316
1900165442.191158.396517
Table 3: Regression of Daily Trees Planted on Payment System
Observations     983
F(  1,   981) =  135.71
Prob > F      =  0.00
R-square      =  0.12
P>|T|T-StatisticStd. ErrorCoefficientVariable
0.00-11.6531.13-362.67Fixed Wage
0.0070.1113.94977.09Constant
Table 4: Regression of Daily Trees Planted on Payment System
                Controlling for Individual Specific Effects
Observations   983
F( 17,   965) =   20.97
Prob > F      =  0.00
R-square      =  0.27
P>|T|T-StatisticStd ErrorCoefficientVariable
0.00-12.5029.29-366.20Fixed Wage
0.0012.1858.39711.08Constant
0.007.4774.01553.13Imax
0.29-1.0794.14-100.74Imin
257.82Iave
Notes: Imax is the maximum value of the individual effect coefficients
            Imin is the minimum value of the individual effect coefficients
            Iave is the average value of the individual effect coefficients
Table 5: Regression of Daily Real Wage on Payment System
Observations    983
F(  1,   981) =   13.83
Prob > F      =  0.0002
R-square      =  0.0139
P>|T|T-StatisticStd ErrorCoefficientVariable
0.00-3.7216.06-59.71Fixed Wage
0.0071.547.19514.26Constant
Table 6: Regression of Daily Real Wage on Payment System
                Controlling for Individual Specific Effects
Observations      983
F( 17,   965) = 13.32
Prob > F      =   0.00
R-square      =   0.19
P > |T|T-StatisticStd ErrorCoefficientVariable
0.00-4.0315.02-60.56Fixed Wage
0.0013.0629.94390.90Constant
0.006.9737.62261.99Imax
0.22-1.2448.26-59.84Imin
118.54Iave
Notes: Imax is the maximum value of the individual effect coefficients
            Imin is the minimum value of the individual effect coefficients
            Iave is the average value of the individual effect coefficients
Table 7: Structural Estimates
19.15Objective Function
P > |T|T-StatisticStd ErrorCoefficientParameter
0.0023.970.020.42sig2s
0.009.500.020.22sigmu
0.0041.4217.20712.36ebar
0.0055.440.010.66k
6.92E-064.526.67E-043.02E-032pbeta
0.0036.390.093.12eta
88.53Incentive Effect
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